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LEVERAGE: STATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN
THE WAKE OF THE ROBO-SIGN SCANDAL
Raymond H. Brescia∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2010, the revelations that tens of thousands of foreclosure filings
across the nation were likely fraudulent—if not outright criminal—sparked a
nation-wide investigation by all fifty state attorneys general to assess the extent of
the scandal and its potential impacts, but also to consider likely legal and policy
responses to such behavior. One of the tools at the state attorneys general’s
disposal that might rein in this behavior includes each state’s Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws. Such laws typically prohibit “unfair” and
“deceptive” practices, which are described loosely in these laws, and often give
consumers, as well as state attorneys general, the ability to bring affirmative
litigation to rein in practices that violate their provisions. They are often drafted
with less specificity than other laws, and give litigants and the courts a certain
degree of leeway in mapping out their contours in response to evolving market
practices. In this way, UDAP laws serve a critical consumer protection function by
filling in gaps in the law where other, more targeted laws might not cover practices
that have a harmful impact on consumers. Since their inception, UDAP laws have
been used to rein in abusive practices in such areas as used car sales, telemarketing
and even the sale of tobacco products. This article explores the availability of
UDAP laws and the remedies they provide to rein in the range of practices revealed
in the so-called “Robo-Sign Scandal.” It concludes that such practices—the false
affidavits, reckless claims, and improper notarizations—all violate the essence of
most state UDAP laws; accordingly, the remedies available under such laws may
be wielded by state attorneys general to halt abusive foreclosure practices
throughout the nation. What is more, UDAP actions in light of robo-sign abuses
could help chart a path towards a more robust mortgage modification regime, one
that would result in principal reductions. In the end, such strategies offer the
clearest path out of the current foreclosure crisis.
This paper is divided into seven sections. Sections two and three provide
overviews, respectively, of the present state of the foreclosure scandal as well as
state UDAP laws generally. The fourth section discusses the use of state UDAP
laws to combat predatory lending in the last decade. The fifth analyzes the
prospects for applying UDAP laws and remedies to improprieties in the foreclosure
process itself. Section six discusses a potential barrier to the use of the UDAP laws
∗ Visiting Clinical Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School, and Assistant Professor of Law,
Albany Law School. The author would like to thank Elizabeth Renuart for her thoughtful and insightful
editorial assistance with parts of this essay. Carolyn Carter of the National Consumer Law Center also
contributed helpful comments. Meghan McDonough was and Tabitha Edgers were, as always,
remarkable, efficient and effective research assistants, for which I am grateful. Fredd Brewer and
Theresa Colbert provided essential support as well, for which I am also grateful. Any errors or
omissions are exclusively mine, however.
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in the foreclosure context: namely, the threat of federal pre-emption of such UDAP
laws and enforcement actions.
II. THE ROBO-SIGN SCANDAL.
In late September 2010, fact-finding processes in several foreclosure cases
revealed rampant fraud in the manner in which many banks handled those and
many other foreclosures.1 The most egregious example of such fraud could be
found in what has come to be known as “robo-signing”: the use of surrogates to
sign foreclosure paperwork.2 In many instances, the fraud goes much deeper,
however, revealing fundamental problems with the claims of many banks in tens of
thousands of foreclosure cases. These revelations raise doubts about whether these
banks even have the right to foreclose on borrowers where such banks have
difficulty proving that they are a party to the mortgages that underlie the
foreclosure actions in question.3 In order to explain these problems, a brief
description of the mortgage origination, securitization, and foreclosure processes is
in order.
A. Background: Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Recording Acts.
When a borrower takes out a mortgage to purchase a property, he or she makes
a promise to the bank that the mortgage loan will be paid back, and typically
“secures” that loan by pledging the property purchased as collateral for the loan.4
If the borrower defaults on the loan, the bank can seek to take back the collateral
securing that loan: the home. In nearly half of U.S. states, banks seeking to
foreclose on a property for the borrower’s failure to maintain his or her obligations
on the loan must go through the courts to seek a court order to foreclose on the
property.5 This process, which dates back hundreds of years, is known as the
1. On the origins of the underlying events that revealed the practices that have come to be known
as the Robo-Sign Scandal, see David Streitfeld, From a Maine House, a National Foreclosure Freeze,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/business/
15maine.html.
2. For a description of robo-signing practices, see CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER
OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION 9 (2010) [hereinafter CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL], available
at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010313/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop111610-report.pdf.
3. See Rod S. Dubitsky, Foreclosure Flaws Trigger New Round of Uncertainty, PIMCO ADVISORY
(Jan. 2011), http://www.pimco.com/Pages/ForeclosureFlawsTriggerNewRoundofUncertainty.aspx.
4. See DAVID SIROTA, ESSENTIALS OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE 111 (2003) (stating “[i]n exchange
for a certain consideration, usually a sum of money, a mortgagor will pledge property as collateral to
back up the promise to repay a mortgage.”).
5. John Carney, A Primer on the Foreclosure Crisis, CNBC.COM (Oct. 11, 2010),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/39617381/A_Primer_On_The_Foreclosure_Crisis (noting that “[t]wenty-three
states . . . require banks to go to court to get a foreclosure order. These are the ‘judicial states.’”). See
also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 12 n.17 (stating that “[t]wenty-two states require
judicial oversight of foreclosure proceedings.”). But see JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS DEPRIVE HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC
PROTECTIONS 12 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_
laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf (placing the number of non-judicial foreclosure states at 31, including
the District of Columbia, leaving only 20 “judicial states”). According to Rao and Walsh, the non-
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process of foreclosure, an ancient remedy which “foreclosed” the borrower’s right
of “redemption”: the right to satisfy the mortgage.6 Over the years, in the “judicial
foreclosure states,” when a borrower is in default and the lender wishes to take
back the collateral, pursuing a court order that will transfer title in the property to
the lender is the exclusive remedy available to lenders to enforce the provisions of
the mortgage agreement.7
In the thirty states that permit “non-judicial foreclosures,” a court order is not
required to reclaim title to the property through foreclosure.8 The lender simply
gives notice to the borrower that it intends to foreclose on the property.9 Title to
the property is typically auctioned to a third party and the transfer of the interest in
the property brings with it a right to seek a court order to remove the borrower from
the home, if he or she has not voluntarily vacated the premises.10

judicial foreclosure states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. By implication,
the “judicial states” would be: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
6. Traditionally, this right of redemption was a right a borrower could exercise even after he or she
lost the property to the lender and the lender sold it to a third party. By exercising the right of
redemption, the borrower could often regain the property, and evict the new purchaser, simply by paying
off the debt. The right to “foreclose the right of redemption” arose as a lender’s equitable remedy to
prevent the borrower from coming back later to claim the property. By obtaining a court order
foreclosing the right of redemption, the lender, and any subsequent purchaser, was able to make certain
that a sale of the property would not be challenged later by the borrower seeking to reclaim the property
by paying off the debt. For an overview of the history of foreclosure law, see GRANT S. NELSON &
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 7-10 (4th ed. 2001); Michael H. Schill, An Economic
Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489 (1991).
7. See Carney, supra note 5.
8. See RAO, supra note 5, at 11 (stating that “in thirty states and the District of Columbia,
homeowners can lose their homes with no court oversight over the process and without an opportunity
to be heard.”).
9. Id. (stating that in the non-judicial foreclosure states “foreclosures are accomplished by the
mortgage holder’s exercise of the ‘power of sale’ contained in the mortgage or deed of trust. The
mortgage holder does not need to initiate a court proceeding to foreclose and the homeowner has no
clear access to a court hearing. The holder typically only needs to send a notice of sale to the
homeowner, place a legal advertisement in a local newspaper, and hire an auctioneer to sell the property
on the scheduled sale date.”)
10. See, e.g., Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending
the Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139,
149 (2006) (“The auctioneer generally sells the property to the highest bidder….Sometimes, the highest
bidder may (1) take immediate possession of the premises upon full payment of the purchase price; or
(2) obtain an order for immediate possession from the court.”); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman,
Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1507 (2004)
(“Once foreclosure has occurred, sale purchasers sometimes have difficulty obtaining physical
possession of the real estate from those whose rights the foreclosure has terminated…. [I]f foreclosure is
nonjudicial, the purchaser faces a dilemma when possession is not surrendered voluntarily. Self-help,
peaceable or otherwise, generally may not be used to acquire possession.”). See also, Rao, supra note 5,
at 12 (“After the auctioneer’s hammer falls in most states, the sale itself is final and cannot be undone….
Only after the foreclosure sale is there a court proceeding in these states to remove a homeowner who
does not voluntarily vacate, but by then it is usually too late to contest the sale.”).
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Once property is used as collateral to secure loans, there is a heightened risk
that conflicting claims will arise over the right to title of the property. Disputes can
occur at practically every step of the process: whether the borrower is in default,
which would trigger the lender’s right to foreclose; whether the lender properly
foreclosed on the property by following the appropriate procedures for doing so;
whether a third-party purchasing the property out of foreclosure had a right to do
so, to name just a few. Over the years, important legal protections have been put in
place to minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the risk that conflicting claims to
the property will arise.11 One of the most important of these protections is that in
many jurisdictions a lender must maintain, in its possession, the original loan
documents to prove that he or she has the right to foreclose on the property.12
Without such evidence of authority to foreclose, multiple parties could claim the
right to foreclose, making it unclear to a borrower who he or she should pay to
maintain his or her mortgage obligations.13 Furthermore, prospective third-party
purchasers of properties after foreclosure might purchase such properties from
parties that do not have the right to foreclose upon and sell such properties.14
Multiple parties could claim title: the borrower, who might protest that he or she is
current on his or her mortgage; the lender who possesses the original mortgage
documents; a third-party purchaser, claiming he or she purchased the property from
a party claiming to have had the right to sell it.15
Another important mechanism for protecting the rightful claims of lenders,
borrowers, and third-parties is the manner through which each state requires
anyone with an interest in property to notify appropriate authorities of that interest
by recording evidence of that interest in a central, publicly accessible location or
through some electronic, publicly searchable database.16 These property recording
systems, typically administered at the local level, serve as central access points for
anyone who may wish to purchase property to determine who claims an interest in
the property he or she wishes to buy.17 Research at the local level will reveal the
presence of property law claims so that one can purchase property with confidence
that no one with a conflicting claim will come forward later to challenge the
11. See Schill, supra note 6, at 492.
12. Kenneth M. DeLashmutt, Does the Lender Have the “Original” Note in Hand?, BANK FRAUD
VICTIM CENTER, http://mortgage-home-loan-bank-fraud.com/articles/stop_foreclosure.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2011). See also High Court’s Low Opinion of Foreclosure Process, WHERE’S OUR MONEY?
(Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.wheresourmoney.org/?p=1318.
13. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 5.
14. Id. (stating that “if [clear and uncontested property rights] are called into question . . . .
Borrowers who have already suffered foreclosure may seek to regain title to their homes and force any
new owners to move out. Would-be buyers and sellers could find themselves in limbo, unable to know
with any certainty whether they can safely buy or sell a home.”).
15. Id. For a comparison of judicial and non-judicial foreclosure processes, see Georgina W. Kwan,
Mortgagor Protection Laws: A Proposal for Mortgage Foreclosure Reform in Hawai’i, 24 HAW. L.
REV. 245, 253-257 (2001).
16. New York City’s ACRIS database is one example of an online, searchable database that tracks
interests in real property located within that city. See New York City’s Automated City Register
Information System, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/jump/acris.shtml (last visited Oct.
28, 2011).
17. Bill Bronchik, The Property Recording System, REICLUB.COM, http://reiclub.com/articles/
property-recording-system (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
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purchase because the seller of the property did not have the legal right to sell it. As
the following discussion shows, practices in the mortgage market over the last
decade mean these protections are more important, not less. This phenomenon
makes the problems revealed in the present scandal even more troublesome.18
B. The Modern Mortgage Market and the Rise of Securitization.
The modern mortgage market does not resemble the picture painted of it in the
film “It’s a Wonderful Life.” There, the venerable Bailey Building & Loan used
depositors’ funds to make mortgage loans to local borrowers. As Jimmy Stewart’s
George Bailey intones when he faces his depositors who have gathered and are
making a run on the institution, seeking to withdraw their savings: “the money’s
not here, it’s in Joe’s house, that’s right next to yours, and in the Kennedy house
and Mrs. Maicklin’s house and a hundred others.”19 This quaint approach to
community banking is now all but extinct. For the most part, gone are the days
when a local lender makes mortgage loans in its local community and keeps such
loans on its books for the duration of those loans. During the height of the
subprime mortgage mania of the last decade, “originate to securitize” was the
widespread practice, changing the rules of the game, and leading to many of the
present problems exposed by the Robo-Sign Scandal.20
For decades, banks engaged in mortgage lending faced a liquidity problem.21
They would have funds to lend to prospective borrowers, but those funds would be
tied up in long-term, fixed rate loans once they committed those funds to a loan.22
While the business of banking may have been boring and slow moving, it certainly
could lead to steady, if not fantastic, profits. In the 1970s, a new model arose that
promised to revolutionize mortgage finance, although it would not grow in
popularity until the late 1990s.23 Under this approach, known as mortgage
18. The facts revealed in the Robo-Sign Scandal raise the specter that it may take years to work
through the apparent defects in title of many of the entities claiming to hold mortgages on individual
properties and of anyone who has purchased property from such entities. This process will inevitably
raise transaction costs associated with proving title to land so that owners can use such property to
secure capital and, should they wish, alienate it freely. Such a process can hamper economic
development considerably. As Hernando de Soto argues, a functioning system of property titling is
often what distinguishes functioning and dynamic economies from ones that are stagnant. HERNANDO
DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHED IN THE WEST AND FAILS
EVERYWHERE ELSE 39-68 (2000).
19. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
20. In 2008, then Securities and Exchange Commissioner Christopher Cox argued that the
“originate to securitize” model was at the heart of the financial crisis because of the incentives such an
approach created: “When mortgage lending changed from originate-to-hold to originate-to-securitize, an
important market discipline was lost. The lenders no longer had to worry about the future losses on the
loans, because they had already cashed out.” The Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit
Crisis for the Future of Regulation, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
110th Cong. 26 (2008).
21. KENNETH W. EDWARDS, YOUR SUCCESSFUL REAL ESTATE CAREER 98 (2007).
22. Id. (stating that “[i]n the past, lenders were badly burned when changing economic
circumstances forced them to start paying more for their money while their assets were tied up in long
term, low-yielding real estate loans.”).
23. Arturo Estrella, Securitization and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy, 8 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.
ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 3, 5 (2002), available at http://ftp.ny.frb.org/research/epr/02v08n1/0205estr.pdf.
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securitization, lenders could convert the future income stream they could generate
from the promise of mortgage payments into a present cash payoff.24 Other
institutions, typically investment banks, would purchase the right to collect the
future income streams from loan originators by purchasing the mortgage from that
originator.25 The investment bank would then bundle mortgages, representing the
income streams they would generate, into investment vehicles.26 Those investment
banks would then sell the right to collect those future income streams to other
investors.27 With securitization, lenders could generate profits not from the
payments they would receive from the borrowers over the length of the loans they
made to such borrowers, but, rather, from the fees they could collect from the
investment banks for selling the loans to those banks.28
With the growth of mortgage securitization, the business model of many
mortgage lenders would evolve over time.29 Their main focus would change from
assessing the quality of a prospective borrower and the likelihood that he or she
would pay back a loan over time, to calculating the fees the lender could collect by
selling loans to investment banks.30 Given the short-term gains mortgage lenders
could reap from selling such loans as quickly as possible to those banks, the
quantity of loans the lender could sell was more important than the quality of such
loans: i.e., total loan volume was more important than the likelihood that any
particular borrower would pay back his or her loan.31
But mortgage securitization would not take root as a widespread practice in the
mortgage industry until the early 2000s, when global events would whet the
appetite of investors for mortgage-backed securities.32 In the aftermath of the
tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the recession that followed, the Federal
Reserve slashed interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities in order to spur
investment and prevent a complete investor retreat to the safety of those
securities.33 Investors looked for other investment vehicles, and mortgage-backed
securities seemed to fit that bill: they held out the promise of solid returns on
investment and the underlying securities earned a “AAA” rating from credit ratings
agencies (i.e., typically the highest grade those ratings agencies assign).34 What is
24. Id. at 3. See generally Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009) (providing an overview of the securitization
process and its role in the financial crisis).
25. Eggert, supra note 24, at 1259.
26. Id. at 1266.
27. Id.
28. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 76 (2010) (providing a description of the role of the fee structure in the
securitization process and its relation to loan volume); MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 360º LOOK
AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS 95 (2009)
(same).
29. See Eggert, supra note 24, at 1264-68.
30. ZANDI, supra note 28, at 95-96; Eggert, supra note 24, at 1268.
31. See Eggert, supra note 24, at 1268 (discussing the impact of securitization on the mortgage
market).
32. DANIEL GROSS, DUMB MONEY: HOW OUR GREATEST FINANCIAL MINDS BANKRUPTED THE
NATION 13–20 (2009).
33. Id.
34. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 28, at 131.
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more, this appetite for mortgage-backed securities coincided with the rise of a
number of other phenomena. First, “innovations” in mortgage products began to
take hold, and the dominance of the market by the standard 30-year fixed rate
mortgage gave way to a slew of new mortgage products: adjustable rate mortgages;
higher-interest mortgages; and more exotic products, like no documentation loans,
interest only loans, and negative amortizing loans.35 These non-standardized
products were used to bring non-traditional borrowers into the mortgage market:
i.e., borrowers with lower credit scores; with little history with credit; with lower,
less regular incomes; and with few assets.36 Although many touted the benefits of
homeownership,37 expanding the pool of prospective borrowers ultimately served
one larger end: creating more mortgages to securitize, which would lead to more
fees for originators, mortgage brokers, investment banks, and the credit ratings
agencies that assessed the investment quality of the mortgage-backed securities at
the center of the fee-generating chain.38
C. Drawing a Line from Securitization to the Robo-Sign Scandal.
In retrospect, the connection between securitization and the Robo-Sign
Scandal appears quite clear. During the height of the subprime mortgage market,
the business model of mortgage lenders—those entities that originate mortgages—
was one built on quick resale of their product, not long-term “curation”: a more
traditional approach that included cultivating borrowers for a relationship that
extended through the life of the loan.39 As economist Joseph Stiglitz40 and FDIC
Chair Sheila Bair41 both assert, one of the chief causes of the collapse of the
mortgage market in the United States was the breakdown of this traditional
borrower-lender relationship. With a focus on the quantity of the loans they could
generate, and not their quality, that quality dropped considerably, particularly in the
later years of the housing bubble.42 Lenders sought a continuous stream of
borrowers, creating innovative lending products to bring down traditional barriers
35. Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How did it Happen and
How will it End, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN., no. 2, 2007, at 13-15 (describing lowering of underwriting
criteria and creation of exotic loan products).
36. See id.
37. See generally ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US (2009)
(describing efforts by elected officials to promote homeownership in the United States).
38. See ZANDI, supra note 28, at 95 (discussing the role of the mortgage originators’ compensation
structure in the securitization process and its impact on the mortgage market); Krinsman, supra note 35,
at 13 (providing an overview of the expansion of the subprime mortgage market in the 2000s).
39. Arva Rice, Subprime Lenders Could Have Learned a Thing or Two From New York, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arva-rice/subprime-lenders-couldha_b_76538.html (stating “[s]o why have we succeeded where others failed? Well, for one reason,
because we based our business model on opportunity, not failure.”).
40. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 14 (2010).
41. Sheila C. Blair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Address before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Financial Services: Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures
(Apr. 17,2007) (transcript available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/
chairman/ spapr1707.html).
42. See, Krinsman, supra note 35, at 14-15 (describing the lowering of underwriting criteria to
expand the pool of mortgage borrowers).
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that kept potential customers from taking out loans.43 This fed not only the
lenders’ own appetite for the fees selling those mortgages could generate, but also
the desire of investors to increase their holdings in mortgage-backed securities (not
to mention the interest of those investors who wanted to “short” the housing
market—generate securities, particularly ones that might underperform, so that
they could bet they would fail through the purchase of “Credit Default Swap”
insurance to protect against such failure).44
But this focus on quantity not quality lies at the heart of the Robo-Sign
Scandal in many less obvious ways. First, as these mortgages were packaged, sold
and re-sold on the secondary mortgage market, buyers and sellers of those
mortgages were often overwhelmed with the sheer volume of mortgages they
needed to process and the speed with which those mortgages changed hands.45 As
a result, in the securitization process, not all transactions were properly
documented and recorded, and bank personnel often failed to secure and maintain
original documents throughout the course of these transactions.46 Second, once
millions of mortgages went into default, servicers and lenders charged with
foreclosing on those mortgages were overwhelmed with the sheer volume of
mortgages that needed some form of action taken due to borrower delinquency.47
As a result, we now know that in tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of
instances, institutions seeking to foreclose on mortgages failed to follow basic
procedural rules for filing papers in foreclosure actions; it is this failure that lies at
the heart of the Robo-Sign Scandal.48
The acts underlying this scandal include the following: In documents
submitted to courts where foreclosure actions were being pursued, sworn affidavits
contained a range of potentially false and/or frivolous allegations. These
documents, signed under oath, included allegations that the bank official or the
employee of a loan servicer who signed the affidavit: (1) reviewed essential
documents related to the case, (2) could attest that the borrower was in default, and
(3) could make representations that the plaintiff in the case (the lender, servicer or
other entity claiming an interest in the mortgage) had the right to pursue the
foreclosure of the property securing the mortgage allegedly in default. These

43. Id.
44. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 28 (2010) (discussing
the role of investors “shorting” the housing market).
45. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 7, 9-11.
46. See Gretchen Morgenson, Trying to Put a Price on Bank Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at
BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/business/21gret.html?pagewanted=all.
47. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 7, 9-11 (stating that bank “employees were
having trouble keeping up with the crush of foreclosures.”).
48. See id. at 9. The report outlines one example:
In a June 7, 2010, deposition, Jeffrey Stephan, who worked for GMAC Mortgage as a
“limited signing officer,” testified that he signed 400 documents each day. In at least
some cases, he signed affidavits without reading them and without a notary present. . . .
Similarly, [Bank of America was] faced with revelations that robo-signers had signed
tens of thousands of foreclosure documents without actually verifying the information in
them . . . .
Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
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affidavits were then purportedly notarized in the presence of a notary public.49 As
the following discussion shows, in many cases, virtually every aspect of these
affidavits was defective.
First, the affiants (the individuals signing the affidavits), signing these
documents on behalf of his or her employer (the plaintiff in the case), often did not
review any documents in the case prior to signing the affidavit.50 Second, even if
the affiant did review records related to the case, the records related to borrower
payment history were often incomplete or inaccurate.51 Third, the affiant had no
way of proving that his or her employer had the original documents in its
possession to prove that the plaintiff had the right to bring the action.52 Fourth, the
affiant, in all too many instances, simply did not sign the affidavit personally: this
task was often delegated to other employees who, themselves, had no knowledge of
the contents of the affidavit and forged the signature of the person whose name
appeared on it.53 Finally, just as the affidavits were forged in many instances, the
individuals serving as notaries public often did not witness the signature of the
affiant, despite acknowledging such signature and certifying them for filing with a
court.54 These affidavits, with all of these fatal defects, were then filed in courts
throughout the country in support of claims that foreclosure actions should go
forward.55
Despite the wide-spread nature of this scandal, for the most part, courts have
yet to mete out penalties for these activities.56 At present, the attorneys general of
49. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 11 n.12; Brady Dennis, Robo-Signer Played
Quiet Role in Huge Number of Foreclosures, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092206650.html
(describing the acts and practices that have come to be known as robo-signing); Gretchen Morgenson,
Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/business/04mortgage.html?pagewanted=all..
50. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that employees were signing hundreds
of documents each day without verifying information contained within).
51. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Probe Targets Foreclosure Paperwork, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2010,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704164004575548580189204898.html.
52. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing a 2007 study that showed
“mortgage companies who filed claims to be paid in bankruptcy cases of homeowners did not attach a
copy of the note to 40% of their claims.”).
53. Id. at 7 (stating “[e]mployees . . . have testified that they signed, and in some cases backdated,
thousands of documents attesting to personal knowledge of facts about the mortgage and the property
that they did not actually know to be true.”).
54. See David Streitfeld & Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosure Furor Rises; Many Call for a Freeze,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/
06mortgage.html?_r=2& ref=your-money.
55. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 2, at 11-12. The extent to which similar practices
infected foreclosure actions in non-judicial foreclosure states is still unknown. Hopefully, the attorney
general investigation will reveal whether such practices spread into those states as well. As the Ibanez
case, discussed infra, reveals, however, defects in a foreclosing mortgagee’s title can have an impact in
non-judicial foreclose states as well by raising questions about the validity of title of subsequent
purchasers who buy property from those mortgagees after foreclosure.
56. Even before the facts concerning robo-signing came to light, conscientious judges handling
foreclosure actions noted the inability of at least some mortgagees to establish their standing to sue in
foreclosure actions because they were unable to prove that they held an interest in the properties that
were the subject of the actions. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 84011 (N.D.
Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing foreclosure actions for plaintiffs’ failure to establish their ownership
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all fifty states are conducting an investigation into the abuses described above. 57
But what remedies, if any, are available to such public officials for these practices?
First and foremost, many of these acts involved criminal conduct. Affidavits
must be signed under oath and under the penalties of perjury. Those penalties in
many states are criminal in nature. That allegations were made with no basis in
fact (e.g., that an affiant had reviewed bank records, when he or she had not); that
documents were forged; that signatures were improperly notarized: all of these acts
open the participants in this course of conduct to criminal prosecution. Moreover,
the filing of such fraudulent documents that contain blatant misrepresentations,
omissions, and errors may have consumer protection implications as well. The
remainder of this paper addresses this issue: did robo-sign practices expose lenders,
mortgage servicers, and other entities responsible for such acts to civil liability
under state consumer protections laws?
III. STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION THROUGH “UDAP” LAWS.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have some statutory ban on unfair
or deceptive practices in trade or commerce.58 Many of these Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws were adopted in the 1970s and early 1980s as
states sought new tools to protect consumers from abusive business practices.59
These laws are modeled on the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which
Congress passed in 1914 and makes unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”60 These state UDAP statutes are often referred to as “little FTC Acts,”
and provide a wide array of tools to consumers and state attorneys general to
combat unfair and deceptive business practices. One of the limitations of the
FTCA is that it is typically only enforced by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.
Unlike the FTCA, however, all state UDAP statutes grant consumers a private right
of action to enforce their provisions61 and state attorneys general also have standing
to bring actions alleging UDAP violations.62

interest in the underlying mortgages); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Yeasmin, No. 50927U, slip op. at *6
(N.Y. App. Div. May 24, 2010) (finding arguments of counsel regarding plaintiff’s right to foreclose “so
incredible, outrageous, ludicrous and disingenuous that they should have been authored by the late Rod
Serling, creator of the famous science-fiction television series, The Twilight Zone.”). See also Raymond
H. Brescia, Beyond Balls and Strikes: Towards a Problem-Solving Ethic in Foreclosure Proceedings, 59
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305, 345 n.144 (2009) (collecting early cases).
57. Diana Olick, State AG Robosigning Settlement Brewing, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2010, 7:06PM),
available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/40220735/State_AG_Robosigning_Settlement_Brewing.
58. CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50 STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR
AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 5 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf.
59. Id. at 5-6.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
61. See CAROLYN CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES
§§ 7.2.1-7.2.2 (7th ed. 2008) (providing a general discussion of private rights of action under different
states’ UDAP provisions). Until recently, all states’ UDAP laws except Iowa’s granted individuals a
private right of action to sue for violations of those laws. In 2009, the Iowa legislature amended that
state’s statute to permit such private rights of action. 2009 IOWA LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 167 (West).
62. See CARTER, supra note 58, at 6.
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The FTCA and its state cousins are broad and remedial in nature, and prohibit
conduct in general terms rather than drawing strict lines and giving clear guidance
about what is outlawed and what is not.63 When Congress first passed the FTCA, it
recognized the limitations of drafting overly specific provisions given the shifting
nature of unfair and deceptive conduct and the impossibility of spelling out every
type of behavior the FTCA would prohibit:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no
limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were
specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over
again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an
64
endless task.

Consistent with this approach, while some state statutes specifically describe the
acts that can constitutes violations of those states’ UDAP statutes,65 many of these
laws contain general prohibitions against unfair or deceptive practices.66 With the
goal of adapting to changing practices in the market, they contain specific clauses
that describe some acts as unfair or deceptive, but also include “catch all”
provisions that rein in any conduct that could be construed as unfair or deceptive.67
As a further example of the deep connections between state laws and the FTCA,
many states specifically incorporate interpretations of the FTCA into the judicial
treatment and interpretation of their own UDAP statutes.68
In 2002, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a
guidance letter on unfair and deceptive mortgage practices in which it re-stated
Federal Trade Commission interpretations of the meaning of the key components
of the FTCA.69 The OCC laid out the basic elements of claims arising under the
FTCA and UDAP statutes as follows:
For an act to qualify as a “deceptive” practice, the following must occur:
•
•

There is a representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead.
The act or practice would be deceptive from the perspective of a reasonable
consumer.

63. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(a) (providing simply that “[u]nfair methods of
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful.”).
64. H.R. Rep. No. 63-1142 (1914).
65. See, e.g., Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903 (2011) (outlining
thirty-two specific grounds that violate the act).
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive overview of UDAP laws, see
CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 61.
67. For example, the Kansas Consumer Protection Act defines “deceptive acts and practices” as
“include[ing], but … not limited to,” a series of specifically enumerated acts. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50626(b) (2009).
68. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(b) (2011) (expressing intent of state legislature that
courts interpreting state statute should be guided by interpretations of the FTCA).
69. JULIE L. WILLIAMS & EMORY W. RUSHTON, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY,
OCC ADVISORY LETTER: GUIDANCE ON UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES 3-6 (Mar. 22,
2002), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2002/advisoryletter-2002-3.pdf.
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The representation, omission, act, or practice is material.

In terms of “unfair” practices, those occur when the following are present:
•
•
•

The practice causes substantial consumer injury.
The injury is not outweighed by benefits to the consumer or to competition.
The injury caused by the practice is one that consumers could not reasonably
71
have avoided.

Not only are UDAP statutes to be interpreted broadly, the remedies available
to UDAP litigants are varied in scope and powerful. Unlike the FTCA, private
individuals in most states have a right to bring an action under UDAP statutes,
while the attorneys general of every state have the authority to bring actions under
their respective UDAP statutes. Since this paper focuses on those enforcement
powers of attorneys general only, the following discussion highlights the remedies
available in such cases.72 Where an attorney general pursues a UDAP violation in
the courts, the remedies he or she may pursue often include the following: the
imposition of statutorily created civil penalties and fines; the assessment of
damages suffered by victims of the defendant as a result of violations of UDAP
provisions, often awarded in the form of restitution; the award of punitive damages
in some instances; the grant of costs and, at times, attorneys’ fees to successful
litigants; and the issuance of injunctions against unfair and deceptive practices.73
Apart from establishing the basic elements of a UDAP claim—that a particular
act is either deceptive or unfair—and determining the appropriate and available
remedies to seek, when assessing whether conduct related to a foreclosure of a
mortgage might come within the reach of a particular state’s UDAP statute,
litigants face several additional questions. First, is a loan servicer or other entity
involved in carrying out the foreclosure an entity covered by a relevant UDAP
statute? Second, does a particular state’s UDAP laws apply to mortgage
transactions: that is, whether a credit transaction such as a mortgage is a “good” or
a “service” where a particular state’s UDAP statute covers only the sale of goods
and services?74 Third, does a particular state’s UDAP law cover “post-transaction”
activities like debt collection, as opposed to applying only to unfair and deceptive
practices in the marketing or consummation of a sale of goods or services? As to
70. Id. at 3-4.
71. Id. at 4-5.
72. As in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s, state attorneys general, if they pool their resources,
may be able to offset the strategic advantages that many defense counsel may enjoy when compared to
the resources available to the attorneys of private, individual litigants. For an overview of the history of
tobacco litigation and the role played by the state attorneys general in that litigation, see Frank J.
Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that Led to the Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco
Settlement, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 473 (1998). Similarly, state attorneys general can avoid sticky problems
of proof that individual litigants may face, like showing reliance by a particular consumer on a particular
fraudulent communication. Gary L. Wilson & Jason A. Gillmer, Minnesota’s Tobacco Case:
Recovering Damages Without Individual Proof of Reliance Under Minnesota’s Consumer Protection
Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 567 (1999) (discussing the litigation advantages of public attorneys
general).
73. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 61, at app. A.
74. Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 776, 792 (W.D. Ky 2003) (holding that not
only under Kentucky’s UDAP statute does extending a mortgage qualify as the sale of a service but also
that “nearly every state court deciding this question in similar contexts has also reached this outcome.”).
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this question, many states’ laws expressly include such post-transaction activities
within the range of conduct they cover.75
Although there are many similarities among the various states’ UDAP statutes,
there are also many differences and variations. Some prohibit only “deceptive”
acts, as opposed to deceptive and “unfair” acts.76 Some statutes specifically
exempt certain types of financial institutions from their coverage.77 In order to
assess whether a particular state’s UDAP law prohibits any particular acts in any
specific jurisdictions, state attorneys general, advocates, and defense counsel will
have to review their own state’s statutes for the specific limitations that apply to
particular acts and actors within that state.78
Despite these variations, many states have used UDAP laws to attack
questionable mortgage market practices in the courts. The following section
surveys a number of cases in which state UDAP laws have been used against
subprime mortgage lenders. Attorneys general from nearly every state have
attempted to use UDAP remedies to rein in and rectify some of the worst abuses
seen in the mortgage market during its heyday over the last decade. Following this
next section, Section V, infra., looks at the specific application of different UDAP
statutes to unfair or deceptive practices related to foreclosures to assess whether the
acts that have come to be known as the Robo-Sign Scandal might qualify as
actionable conduct under UDAP laws.
IV. APPLICATION OF UDAP LAWS TO MORTGAGES.
Across the nation, state attorneys general have filed a number of high profile
actions under state UDAP laws and other consumer protection statutes against
lenders active in the subprime mortgage market over the last decade. Several high
profile cases have resulted in sweeping settlements that resulted in the payment of
penalties and attorneys fees, and forced lenders to reform their lending practices.
Many of these settlements involved high price tags for the defendant-lenders, and
many included remedial programs to help generate mortgage modifications and
75. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (West 2007) (“No supplier shall commit an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. Such an unfair or
deceptive act or practice by a supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.”)(emphasis added); CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 61, at § 2.2.3.
76. For example, Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act applies to deceptive acts, but not ones that are
unfair. The express terms of the act provide as follows:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, deceptive act or practice,
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or
omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment,
suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise
whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is
declared to be an unlawful practice.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522(A) (2007).
77. See, e.g., Virginia Consumer Protection Act, VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-199(D) (2011). Other states
with similar exemptions include: Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. See
CARTER, supra note 58, at 14.
78. It is beyond the scope of this article to determine in any specific instance whether any discrete
robo-sign practice, by any particular actor, is a violation of any given state’s UDAP laws. Instead, I
have attempted to identify those interpretations of and precedents under various states’ UDAP laws to
show that robo-sign practices appear to fall under such prohibitions generally.
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offer relief to borrowers saddled with predatory loans.
In one of the first of these settlements, in 2006, Ameriquest, which was at the
time the nation’s largest subprime lender, resolved actions filed by forty-nine states
and the District of Columbia alleging that the lender and its affiliates engaged in
unfair and deceptive practices in the origination of subprime loans.79 Through the
settlement, Ameriquest agreed to reform its lending practices and to pay $325
million in damages.80
This payment included restitution to consumers,
compensation to the attorneys general for the cost of bringing the action, and
funding for consumer education.81
Following the Ameriquest settlement, in 2007, the Attorney General of
Massachusetts, Martha Coakley, filed a lawsuit against Fremont General
Corporation (Fremont), a California-based subprime lender that had a large
portfolio of subprime loans in the Bay State.82 After an FDIC investigation
revealed that Fremont had engaged in predatory lending practices, Coakley’s office
reached an agreement with the bank as to how it would handle foreclosures in the
state.83 When the agreement was unsuccessful in preventing the foreclosure of
loans Coakley’s office considered predatory in nature, she filed suit in
Massachusetts state court, seeking an injunction under the state’s UDAP law that
would prevent Fremont from foreclosing on any loan that had questionable
features.84
The heart of the accusations against Fremont included that the bank lured
borrowers into Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) loans without taking into account
those borrowers’ ability to repay the loans once the interest reset and that it offered
100% financing options, with the expectation that the borrower could refinance the
loan (with a prepayment penalty) after a few years.85 The trial court issued an
injunction preventing Fremont from foreclosing on any loan deemed
“presumptively unfair,” without first giving notice to the attorney general’s office
and getting approval from the court.86 The highest court in Massachusetts, in
affirming the lower court’s injunction, summarized Fremont’s practices as follows:
[L]oans were made in the understanding that they would have to be refinanced
before the end of the introductory period. Fremont suggested in oral argument that
the loans were underwritten in the expectation, reasonable at the time, that housing
prices would improve during the introductory loan term, and thus could be

79. E. Scott Reckard, Ameriquest Settles Claims: Accused of Misleading Borrowers with Credit
Problems, the Mortgage Company Will Overhaul Its Lending Practices and Pay $325 Million, L.A.
Times, Jan. 21, 2006, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/21/business/fi-ameriquest21.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Press Release, Office of Mass. Attorney Gen. Martha Coakley, Attorney General Martha
Coakley Reaches $10 Million Settlement with Subprime Lender Fremont Investment and Loan (June 9,
2009) [hereinafter Press Release], available at http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&L=
1&L0=Home&sid=Cago&b=pressrelease&f=2009_06_09_fremont_agreement&csid=Cago.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The terms of the trial court’s injunction can be found in the lower court’s decision.
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BL51, 2008 Mass. Super. LEXIS 46, at *47-50
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2008), aff’d, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).

32

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

refinanced before the higher payments began. However, it was unreasonable, and
unfair to the borrower, for Fremont to structure its loans on such unsupportable
87
optimism.

Ultimately, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the lower court’s
injunction, forcing Fremont to give the requisite pre-foreclosure notice to
Coakley’s office and to seek court approval of any foreclosure on a loan deemed
presumptively unfair.88 The goal of these notice/approval mechanisms was to
improve the chances that Fremont would renegotiate the terms of predatory loans
by bringing the attorney general’s office and the bank to the negotiating table any
time a delinquent loan had questionable features.89 The parties reached a
settlement of the litigation in June of 2009 through which Fremont paid $10 million
to Coakley’s office to be used in part to assist borrowers and made permanent the
terms of the trial court’s injunction, barring Fremont from foreclosing on properties
without the consent of either the attorney general or the court.90
In a series of similar cases, with broader application—and an even higher price
tag—Bank of America settled a group of lawsuits filed by 11 different attorneys
general from across the country for the predatory acts of its subsidiary,
Countrywide, which occurred prior to that lender’s purchase by Bank of America.91
Many of these actions included claims under the different states’ UDAP laws, as
well as common law fraud claims.92 In October 2008, Bank of America settled
these actions for a record $8.4 billion.93 These billions were to be used for direct
loan relief to an estimated 400,000 borrowers nationwide.94 In addition, under the
agreement, Bank of America must attempt to modify mortgages to give borrowers
more favorable and affordable terms, including principal reduction where
appropriate.95
Through the settlement the bank is also supposed to provide
financial assistance to families so that they can relocate if they do not appear able

87. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 558 (Mass. 2008).
88. Id. at 559-62.
89. See Press Release, supra note 82.
90. Id.
91. See Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, NY TIMES,
October 5, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/business/worldbusiness/06iht06countrywide.16713621.html.
92. E.g., Complaint, California v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. LC081846 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 24,
2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1582_draft_cwide_complaint2.pdf
(alleging violations of California Business and Professionals Code section 17500 (prohibiting making or
disseminating untrue or misleading statements) and section 17200 (prohibiting unfair competition));
Complaint, Connecticut v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 1207 (Conn. Super. Ct Aug. 5, 2008), available
at http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/consumers/countrywidelawsuit.pdf (alleging a violation of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); Complaint, Illinois v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No.
08CH22994 (Cook County Cir. Ct. June 25, 2008), available at http://www.ag.state.il.us/
pressroom/2008_06/countrywide_complaint.pdf (alleging violations of Illinois’ Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Practices Act); Complaint, Office of the Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Legal Affairs, Florida v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08 30105 03 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 30, 2008), available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAY-7G5G7L/$file/CountrywideComplaint.pdf (alleging
a violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act).
93. Morgenson, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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to afford a loan even on more favorable terms.96 The agreement also requires
borrowers assisted through the modification or relocation program to sign a general
release, relieving Bank of America and Countrywide from any future liability for
illegality in the terms of the original mortgages written by Countrywide. 97
As I have argued elsewhere, these cases and others suggest that litigation in the
wake of the financial crisis, and the foreclosure crisis that has followed it,
possesses features that fit it within the category of cases known as “mass torts.”98
In the mass torts context, litigation can be used to bring sweeping relief to a wide
range of victims through procedural mechanisms that can facilitate global
settlements of complex social problems.99 Deborah Hensler has identified some of
the key features of this category of cases as follows: numerosity, commonality,
interdependence of case values, controversy over causation, emotional or political
heat, and higher than average claim rates.100 Other important hallmarks of mass
torts litigation include aggregating techniques for adjudicating questions of
liability, causation and damages, as well as mechanisms for compensating
plaintiffs through settlement;101 and collaboration among attorneys on both sides of
the litigation, including sharing information about claim values, relevant evidence,
discovery strategy, and litigation strategy.102
To the extent that the acts underlying the Robo-Sign Scandal, and those efforts
that may be used to rectify the harm emanating from it, may fit under the rubric of
the mass torts paradigm, state attorneys general may pursue litigation and can use
their authority under state UDAP laws to promote meaningful mortgage relief for
borrowers whose properties have been swept up in the scandal.103 The tools at the
disposal of state attorneys general in the wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal—namely,
96. Id.
97. See People v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. LC081846, at 20 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2008),
available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments /press/pdf/n1618_cw_judgment.pdf.
98. See, Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: the Value of a Mass Torts Approach in Subprime
Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009).
99. See id. at 13-17.
100. Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1596 (1995).
101. Brescia, supra note 98, at 14. See also Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 25–40 (1991) (providing an overview of aggregative techniques).
102. See Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 863, 893 (2005) (describing the benefits of collaboration among counsel in mass torts
litigation). The state attorneys general have instituted just this type of collaborative effort, as the offices
of all fifty state attorneys general are working together to investigate robo-sign practices and consider
the law enforcement response. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys General, 50 States Sign
Mortgage Foreclosure Joint Statement (October 13, 2010), available at http://www.naag.org/jointstatement-of-the-mortgage-foreclosure-multistate-group.php.
103. Litigation by state attorneys general certainly fits under the mass torts umbrella; the massive
litigation filed by a majority of the state attorneys general in the 1990s against the tobacco industry is a
paradigmatic example of a mass tort dispute. See Howard M. Erichson, The End of The Defendant
Advantage in Tobacco Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 135-36 (2001)
(noting that state attorneys general have entered “the fray” in mass torts litigation on the plaintiffs’ side);
Wendy E. Wagner, Rough Justice and the Attorney General Litigation, 33 GA. L. REV. 935, 961-62
(1999) (noting that litigation led by state attorneys general has been “uniquely successful” against
tobacco manufacturers); ROBERT L. RABIN, REGULATING TOBACCO 177 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2001) (describing role of attorneys general in tobacco litigation).
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for our purposes here, state UDAP laws—place such law enforcement officials at
the nexus of a wide-ranging series of fraudulent acts. Such acts have tainted
foreclosure processes throughout the nation and raise questions about the
legitimacy of title claims in tens of thousands, if not millions, of cases. Mass torts
litigation, with its aggregating techniques and its ability to achieve global
settlements in complex disputes, is particularly suited to address the actions at the
heart of the Robo-Sign Scandal. As the next section argues, by pursuing UDAP
claims (or perhaps just raising the threat of such claims), state attorneys general can
generate positive social ends in the wake of the scandal, including a reduction in
the social cost of the foreclosure crisis.
V. APPLICATION OF UDAP LAWS AND REMEDIES TO THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS.
This next section addresses two questions: first, whether state UDAP laws
have been applied to practices related to foreclosure proceedings themselves; and,
second, whether UDAP remedies offer creative and effective responses to not just
the Robo-Sign abuses in particular, but also the problem of delinquent and
underwater mortgages in general.
A. The Application of UDAP Laws to Foreclosures.
A range of practices fall under state UDAP laws. One of those practices is
debt collection. Courts routinely consider practices related to foreclosures as
practices worthy of review under the rubric of state UDAP laws. Courts have also
recognized questionable servicer and lender actions related to the foreclosure
process itself as giving rise to a UDAP claim.
The leading case in this area, Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp.,104 was a
bankruptcy proceeding filed in federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. There,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals construed Pennsylvania’s UDAP statute to find
that deceptive practices undertaken during the course of carrying out a foreclosure
gave rise to claims under that state’s UDAP laws.105 The appellate court found that
the bank had engaged in two practices that justified such claims: first, the bank had
knowingly served its foreclosure papers at the borrower’s former residence; and,
second, it had sent out a 30-day notice of intent to foreclose on the borrower, but
began the foreclosure process before the expiration of the 30-day time period set
forth in the notice and required by state law.106 The court found as follows:
Although the failure properly to serve the foreclosure complaint may not by itself
be an unfair practice, here we have considerably more. Fidelity’s conduct
effectively deprived Smith both of an opportunity to cure the default before
imposing additional and unnecessary costs and expenses on her, and of her
opportunity to defend in court. We hold that such conduct is “unfair” in the most
107
basic sense of the word and fraudulent within the meaning of the UDAP.

104.
105.
106.
107.

866 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 585-86.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 584-85.
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Similarly, in an action filed in federal court in Massachusetts, the court in Morse v.
Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Association of Whitman108 found a violation of
that state’s UDAP law where a lender engaged in a series of acts that ultimately led
to the commencement of an unjustified foreclosure on a home mortgage loan.109
There, the lender and borrowers had engaged in a series of transactions, and the
lender had taken action against the borrowers for their apparent failure to maintain
sufficient funds in a checking account to cover their expenses in running a small
business.110 When the borrowers tried to tender payment on their mortgage in a
proper and timely manner, the lender refused such payment, froze their personal
checking account and improperly commenced a foreclosure action on their home
mortgage.111 The jury found for the plaintiff-borrowers on their state UDAP claims,
and the court endorsed that finding as follows:
Improperly freezing the [checking] account, without notice . . . led to excess
interest charges, and also may have led, ultimately, to a reduction in [plaintiff’s]
credit sales. The wrongful institution of foreclosure proceedings, if nothing else,
resulted in unjustified charges by defendant of its costs and attorney’s fees.
Finally, defendant’s refusal to allow refinancing through [a second] bank denied
plaintiffs the use of a sum of money well in excess of their mortgage with
112
defendant. . . .

The court found that all of these acts fell within the scope of Massachusetts’s
UDAP law.113
Similarly, in Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corp.,114 a case arising out of
bankruptcy court in Massachusetts, the court there found that a pattern of lender
activity in a foreclosure action gave rise to a claim under that state’s UDAP law.115
There, the lender commenced a foreclose action after misapplying the payments the
borrower had made to the lender and sending conflicting correspondence to the
borrower about his level of indebtedness and whether he was even in default (partly
because different units within the bank were not communicating effectively and the
bank’s computer system was not accessible to all units of the bank dealing with the
borrower).116 The court concluded that these actions constituted unfair trade
practices in violation of the Massachusetts UDAP law.117 It awarded the borrower
a range of relief, including attorney’s fees for the cost associated with filing a
bankruptcy petition, an injunction, and an order directing the bank to communicate
with credit reporting agencies to advise them that the borrower was not in
foreclosure on the mortgage loan.118

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982).
Id. at 1281-82.
Id. at 1275-76.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1281-82.
Id.
246 B.R. 709 (Bankr. Mass. 2000).
Id. at 733-35.
Id. at 713-21.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 736-37.
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Finally, in Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co.,119 the Supreme Court of
Texas found that a bank that had purchased a mortgage note from a third party
lender could be liable to the borrower under that law for violations of that state’s
UDAP laws.120 The third party, a contractor, had agreed to construct a residence
for the borrowers, who, in exchange, executed a mechanic’s lien naming the
contractor as the payee.121 The contractor both sold the loan note to the bank and
completed only about twenty percent of the repairs, even after drawing down the
bulk of the loan proceeds.122 The purchasing bank, in turn, went ahead and
foreclosed on the property even though the work was not completed.123 The Texas
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the act of foreclosing on the
property when the repairs were not completed was itself a violation of the state’s
UDAP laws, even if carried out by the bank, which was not responsible for the fact
that the work was not completed on the home.124
As these cases make clear, unfair and deceptive practices carried out in the
foreclosure setting itself can give rise to claims that a foreclosing entity violated a
state’s UDAP laws. As made apparent through the revelations from the Robo-Sign
Scandal, lenders, servicers, and other entities processing foreclosure filings
engaged in a range of deceptive acts, all of which would qualify as acts violating
the key provisions of UDAP laws: filing false and misleading affidavits, forging
and improperly notarizing those affidavits, and making claims that they had the
authority to foreclose on mortgages when, at least in some instances, they
possessed neither the ability to prove such claims or even the knowledge to assert
them. If such acts violate a particular state’s UDAP laws, what remedies might
litigants pursuing UDAP claims seek? The following discussion addresses these
and other questions.
B. The Use of UDAP Remedies to Promote Loan Modifications.
Given the broad and remedial nature of UDAP laws, the filing of fraudulent
affidavits qualifies as a deceptive act under most states’ definition of the term
under their respective UDAP provisions. State attorneys general can thus pursue a
range of remedies under their respective UDAP statutes, where such remedies are
available, including civil penalties, restitution and injunctions. In addition, the
actual damages to borrowers wrongfully foreclosed upon would seem quite
substantial, especially if they lost equity in their home or were rendered homeless
119. 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1984).
120. Id. at 707.
121. Id. at 706.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 707-08. In contrast, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that there could be no violation
of that state’s UDAP law where the challenged foreclosure was not contrary to law. Levine v. First
Nat’l Bank, 948 So. 2d 1051, 1066 (La. 2006). In reaching this conclusion, the court did not find that
foreclosure practices were beyond the reach of the UDAP laws, just that the foreclosure challenged in
that action was not improper or unlawful, thus it could not be unfair or deceptive. Id. at 1058, 1066.
The court there also ruled that the grounds that gave rise to the foreclosure emanated from mortgage
provisions that were consistent with federal law, thus any argument that such provisions themselves
violated state law would be pre-empted by the federal law in question. Id. at 1066. For a discussion of
federal pre-emption of state mortgage laws, see infra Part VI.
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as a result of a foreclosure in which a lender or servicer engaged in UDAP
violations in carrying out that foreclosure. Given the high stakes at risk when
deceptive practices are utilized in the foreclosure process, the threat of substantial
civil penalties and punitive damages, as well as injunctions preventing foreclosures
from going ahead when tainted by robo-sign practices, is considerable. At the end
of the day, however, the prospect of a resolution to such claims that minimizes the
threat of substantial penalties or injunctions barring foreclosures from taking place,
or unwinding foreclosures already completed, should be enough to get lenders and
servicers to the negotiating table to bring about solutions to the Robo-Sign Scandal
that are more acceptable to borrowers, lenders, servicers and investors alike.
Apart from resolving such defects, the best solution to the broader foreclosure
crisis is principal reduction: i.e., bringing outstanding debt in line with home
values.125 This both reduces the monthly payments borrowers must make and
strengthens incentives to continue to make those payments by restoring the
prospect of borrower equity in the home. The threat of significant penalties and
injunctions through state UDAP laws for the abuses evident in the Robo-Sign
Scandal may be just the type of leverage needed to convince interested parties that
such principal reductions are a more palatable resolution to UDAP enforcement
actions than allowing them to drag out in the courts, where litigants may obtain
more costly awards and more sweeping remedies.126
Such principal write-downs would not be unprecedented in the UDAP
enforcement context. In both the Fremont litigation and the Countrywide/Bank of
America settlements discussed above,127 UDAP prosecutions were used as leverage
125. STIGLITZ, supra note 40, at 100 (calling mortgage principal reduction “the best option for the
country.”). One of the strongest critiques of mortgage modification programs during the current crisis is
that they rarely result in a reduction of the principal of the underlying mortgage to bring it more into line
with the value of the property in question. See David Indiviglio, Only 0.1% of Government Mortgage
Modifications
Cut
Principal?,
THE
ATLANTIC,
June
24,
1010,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/only-01-of-government-mortgage-modificationscut-principal/58685/ (“[o]ne of the chief criticisms of the government’s Home Affordable Mortgage
Program (HAMP) is that it hasn’t been doing enough to convince underwater homeowners to rework
their loans. The key to doing that is principal modifications.”). See also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY AND THE U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS
REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL THRIFT MORTGAGE LOAN DATA 27 (2010),
available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/482142.pdf (noting just 0.1% of mortgages modified
permanently in the first quarter of 2010 through the Home Affordable Modification Program resulted in
principal reduction).
126. Another point of contention in foreclosure litigation is the fact that a portion of properties
impacted by the present foreclosure crisis are also a part of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System
(MERS), which has come under a degree of scrutiny by courts and litigants recently. See, e.g., In re
Agard, No. 810-77338-reg, slip op. at 35-37 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (rejecting ability of
MERS to assign mortgage); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2010) (same). To
resolve such questions, mortgagees may face similar demands as those that may be made of them to
settle robo-sign disputes. For a discussion of the MERS system, see Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2212-13 (2007). For a discussion of the standing of
MERS in foreclosure actions, see Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Lending and the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1375-86 (2010). A further
discussion of MERS is beyond the scope of this article, however.
127. See supra Part IV. As this article goes to print, at least with respect to many of the state
attorneys general and most of the largest banks, a settlement of charges over the Robo-Sign scandal, one
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to promote mortgage modifications, which could include principal reductions
where appropriate. Getting banks to the settlement table through the pursuit of
UDAP actions for robo-sign abuses could be a primary goal of such actions.
Should lenders and servicers wish to defend those actions on the merits, and risk
judicial intervention that might translate into tens of thousands of dollars in
penalties and punitive damages in each case, such would be their right. At the
same time, a sensible response to such actions by the institutions caught up in the
Robo-Sign Scandal would be to consider more robust foreclosure mitigation
strategies, including meaningful principal write-downs and reductions. State
attorneys general should not hesitate to pursue UDAP remedies for robo-sign
abuses and, at the same time, they should be willing to discuss resolution of UDAP
cases in ways that can help bring about mortgage principal reductions for
borrowers that need such assistance.
Furthermore, to the extent the investigation of robo-sign practices may expose
deeper problems with title, failing to address these problems in a comprehensive
way may mean that questions about title may linger, and costly litigation may
ensue, for years to come, even in non-judicial foreclosure states. An example of
what may unfold over the coming years was made apparent in the recent decision
out of Massachusetts in which a bank’s title to property seized after foreclosure
was called into question, and its ability to sell such property after that foreclosure
was rejected by the state’s highest court.
In U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez,128 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court found that in two consolidated cases the failure on the part of two foreclosing
banks to prove they had an interest in two mortgages meant that their non-judicial
foreclosures of the affected properties were defective.129 The dispute over the
rights of the respective parties in the underlying properties arose in quiet title
actions filed by the foreclosing banks.130 The plaintiff banks had pursued an
affirmative action to ensure that there were no questions clouding their title to the
underlying properties.131 The court rejected the banks’ claims, saying they had not
proven that they had the right to foreclose on the properties in the first place, and
voided the foreclosures.132 As is apparent from this case, disputes such as these can
arise in both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states (Massachusetts is among
the latter group). Unresolved real and perceived defects in title will likely create a
burdensome drag on the alienation of property moving forward, as was the case in
Ibanez. The investigation into and potential litigation surrounding robo-sign
practices may also serve to clear up these kinds of disputes by developing an
effective mechanism for resolving such disputes.

that would involve principal reductions for up to one million borrowers, appears imminent. Gregory
Korte and Julie Schmit, HUD Secretary: Mortgage settlement deal “very close,” USA TODAY, January
19, 2012. http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/story/2012-01-18/mortgage-settlement/
526533821/1.
128. 458 Mass. 637 (2011).
129. Id. at 638.
130. Id. at 638-39.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 650-52.
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VI. FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION OF STATE UDAP LAWS: A POTENTIAL BARRIER TO THE
APPLICATION OF UDAP LAWS TO THE FORECLOSURE CONTEXT.
Even in situations where robo-sign practices are found to violate a particular
state’s UDAP laws, there is still one more question that needs to be answered about
the viability of UDAP claims in the wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal: whether a
particular state’s UDAP laws are pre-empted by federal banking laws with respect
to federally chartered financial institutions.133 As the following discussion shows,
while this question is a legitimate one, it would appear that the scope of federal preemption is not so broad as to encompass and displace the authority of state
attorneys general to bring enforcement actions under state UDAP laws to address
abusive foreclosure practices.
To the extent national banks134 are caught up in the Robo-Sign Scandal, one
issue that may arise in the investigation of this scandal is the extent to which
federal law, most notably the National Bank Act, may pre-empt the ability of state
attorneys general to enforce state UDAP laws. For example, Bank of America is
both a nationally chartered financial institution, which is organized under the
National Bank Act and supervised by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), as well as the nation’s largest servicer of existing mortgage
loans.135 Federally chartered banks like Bank of America may raise as a defense to
any UDAP actions whether the fact that they are “national” banks pre-empts the
133. It is also possible that defendants facing claims that robo-sign practices violate a particular
state’s UDAP laws may raise several other arguments. First, that actions filed in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction and charging UDAP violations in the course of foreclosure proceedings may run
afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine holds that federal district courts should not review
the actions of state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 479
(1983). For an overview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1175 (1999). A second, and
similar, argument defendants may raise involves abstention: that is, asking a federal court to abstain
from adjudicating UDAP claims where the prosecution of such claims may interfere with pending state
court proceedings (here, foreclosure actions of the underlying mortgages). See Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971). For an overview of the Younger abstention doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 819-65 (5th ed. 2007). In both instances, the UDAP claims would have to be
adjudicated in federal court and the plaintiffs in those cases would have to seek an injunction against
any pending foreclosure actions for either potential defense to apply. Because these questions are
beyond the scope of this article, I will not address them here.
134. “National banks” are banks organized under the federal National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21
(2006), and regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency under the Act. Many of the
largest banks, like Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup are national banks. See OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LIST OF NATIONAL BANKS AND FEDERAL BRANCHES AND
AGENCIES ACTIVE AS OF 06/30/2011, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/licensing/nationalbank-lists/bank-list-national-by-name-v2.pdf. Many subprime lenders, on the contrary, were mortgage
lenders not given federal charters and generally not overseen by federal banking regulators. See David
D. Troutt, Disappearing Neighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV. 21, 23 (2010) (describing the environments in
which subprime lenders operated as “regulatory antimarkets, beyond the reach of federal and state
regulators and without the safeguards protecting capital investment in what became ‘prime’
neighborhoods.”).
135. See E. Scott Reckard, Bank of America to Increase Loan Modification Staffing, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2010, at B2, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/04/business/la-fi-bofa-loanmods20101204 (noting Bank of America’s status as the largest servicer of home loans in the nation after it
purchased Countrywide Financial Corp. in 2008).
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application of state law to their foreclosure practices. In sweeping actions over the
last fifteen years, both the OCC and the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
issued opinions and regulations that attempted to prevent state legislatures and state
attorneys general from enforcing state laws against nationally chartered banks and
thrifts.136 For the most part, these agencies were successful in preventing statebased, anti-predatory laws from applying to federally chartered banks and thrifts,
even if those banks provided services within the states in which those laws
applied.137 In a 2007 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, N.A.,138 the pre-emptive effect of federal laws was upheld, not just against
federally chartered banks themselves, but also to the extent those laws applied to
shield the subsidiaries of these banks from the application of many state banking
laws.139 Due to the anti-regulatory philosophy of the Bush Administration,140 state
attorneys general, and state laws they enforced, were often the last line of defense
against predatory lenders. But the pre-emptive effect of OCC and OTS regulations
restricted the ability of these laws and state law enforcement officials to rein in the
predatory practices of federally chartered banks at the height of the subprime
mortgage frenzy of the last decade. In the words of one state attorney general, the
Supreme Court decision endorsing a broad view of pre-emption “‘took 50 sheriffs
off the beat at a time when lending was becoming the Wild West.’”141
While the Dodd-Frank legislation scales back the extent of federal pre-emption
of state laws, the effect of such changes did not go into effect until July of 2011,142
and such changes are only prospective: they do not apply retroactively. But the
fact that the changes to federal pre-emption of state banking laws did not go into
136. After passage of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation over the summer, the
responsibilities of the OTS will be transferred to the OCC. See Hearings on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act Before the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency).
137.See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect
Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. Corp. L. 893, 909 (2011) (“In contrast to the half-hearted
measures taken by federal regulators, many states passed laws and brought enforcement actions to
combat predatory lending. However, the OCC and the OTS responded to those initiatives by
preempting the states' authority to enforce state consumer protection laws against national banks, federal
thrifts, and their subsidiaries and agents.”); Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit
Markets Upstream, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 143, 150-51 (2009) (“Beginning in the 1970s, however, as banks
began to engage in large-scale interstate consumer lending, courts began to hold that state consumerprotection laws were preempted as applied to federally chartered financial institutions.”); Alan H.
Scheiner, State Subprime Lending Litigation and Federal Preemption: Toward A National Standard, 30
Pace L. Rev. 253, 268 (2009) (“Numerous courts of appeals have held that state laws or regulations
similar to subprime lending laws--such as those prohibiting certain practices in consumer lending--are
inapplicable to national banks on the basis of the OCC regulation (or a similar Office of Thrift
Supervision (“OTS”) regulator)….”).
138. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
139. See id. at 20-21.
140. Admittedly, the OTS’s pre-emptive regulations were adopted under President Clinton, but they
were not enforced aggressively until 2003.
141. Jo Becker, White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/21admin.html?pagewanted=all.
142. Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57252 (Sept. 20, 2010) (Treasury Secretary’s setting of
the “transfer date” of responsibilities to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which is also the
date the new pre-emption rules take effect).
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effect until the summer of 2011 does not end the debate in terms of pre-emption
and state UDAP laws. In fact, in June of 2009, the Supreme Court narrowed its
prior ruling on pre-emption, and issued its decision in the case of Cuomo v.
Clearinghouse Ass’n.143 That decision upheld the power of state attorneys general
to bring enforcement actions against federally chartered banks under state law.144
This power was framed in contrast to those entities’ inability to regulate federally
chartered banks and thrifts in terms of their banking practices per se.145 In
Clearinghouse, the Court found that a state attorney general does not have
“visitorial” powers over a national bank, that is: it cannot inspect bank records or
carry out the particular functions of a bank regulator when that bank is a national
bank carrying out powers expressly granted it from the national government.146 At
the same time, banks, whether they are national banks or not, engage in a range of
practices that are covered by state law alone, like state civil rights statutes. The
Court held that an attorney general may bring judicial actions that seek to enforce
such laws, regardless of the status of the bank as a national bank.147 This ruling has
important implications in the UDAP setting, as the following discussion shows.
At the same time, for the purposes of pursing claims against those banks
involved in the Robo-Sign Scandal that might claim pre-emption under either OCC
or OTS regulations still in effect, such pre-emption does not appear to impact the
types of practices brought into question in this scandal. Pre-emption is often
invoked to prevent state regulation of federally chartered banks and thrifts in terms
of the powers they carry out pursuant to their federal charters. But state laws of
general application, which are not directed towards federally chartered institutions
in a discriminatory way—for example, by giving state chartered institutions a leg
up on their federal counterparts—fall outside the scope of pre-empting laws and
regulations. As the Supreme Court in Watters made clear: “Federally chartered
banks are subject to state laws of general application in their daily business to the
extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes of the
[National Bank Act].”148
Moreover, consistent with protecting state authority to regulate in areas
traditionally left to the states, laws related to property, contract and tort are
generally preserved regardless of pre-emption. This is particularly germane to any
discussion of the Robo-Sign Scandal, where the actions of servicers and other
foreclosing entities (to the extent they might be able to invoke federal pre-emption
based on their status as affiliates of federally chartered institutions), are largely
within an area of law typically left to the states, regardless of the status of the
financial institution: i.e., state real property law. Foreclosure processes are
traditionally found in state laws, and there is no federal law of foreclosure. In fact,
the regulation that gave rise to the claims of OTS-regulated thrifts that they were
exempt from state banking laws expressly exempts from preemption those state
laws that “incidentally” affect the operations of OTS-regulated entities and are
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
Id. at 2721-22.
Id. at 2720.
Id. at 2721.
Id. at 2721-22.
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007).

42

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1

more traditionally relegated to state law, such as contract, tort, criminal law, and
real property law.149 Similarly, the OCC’s pre-emption regulations do not apply to
state laws pertaining to contract, the “right to collect debts,” the acquisition and
transfer of property, and any other law that only “incidentally” affects a national
bank’s lending activities.150
In one case in which the question of the scope of federal pre-emption of state
UDAP laws figured prominently, the court, the federal district court for the
Northern District of California, found that the manner in which a federally
chartered bank handled mortgage payments was not exempt from the reach of
California’s UDAP statute, regardless of the fact that the financial institution had a
federal charter.151 In Jefferson v. Chase Home Finance, the court concluded as
follows:
The core of each of Plaintiff’s causes of action is the claim that Chase
misrepresented how it would credit prepayments to Plaintiff’s account. Plaintiff
also contends that Chase’s systematic breach of the promises about how it would
credit prepayments is an unfair business practice under the [California UDAP
statute] . . . Plaintiff does not claim that California consumer protection laws
require Chase to service or process loans, include specific content in its
disclosures, or handle repayment of loans in any particular manner-requirements
that would be preempted. See 12 C.F.R. §34.4 (a). Instead Plaintiff claims that
the laws require Chase to refrain from misrepresenting the manner in which it does
service loans. The core issue in this case will be not whether or when Chase is
permitted to place payments in suspense accounts, but whether Chase
misrepresented to customers what it would do with their payments.
The duty to refrain from misrepresentation falls on all businesses. It does not target
or regulate banking or lending, and it only incidentally affects the exercise of
banks’ real estate lending powers. Chase has not articulated any way that
enforcing state laws prohibiting misrepresentation to consumers would interfere
with a bank’s nationwide operation or “obstruct, impair or condition” its ability to
engage in real estate lending any more than those laws impair the operation of any
152
business.

As the decision in Jefferson holds, regulating the representations the lender in
question made about how it serviced the plaintiff’s loan—i.e., its disclosures about
how it credited payments—is not pre-empted by the force of federal laws designed
to ensure that state laws do not discriminate against federally chartered institutions
or interfere with the manner in which the federal government regulates them.
Holding federally chartered institutions to a duty of care that all businesses in a
state must meet does not constitute an interference with essential federal rights.
In the wake of the Robo-Sign Scandal, to permit enforcement of state UDAP
laws by applying them to the foreclosure practices of lenders and loan servicers,
even when those entities are federally chartered institutions or their subsidiaries,
preserves the state’s traditional authority over its laws concerning real property.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2011).
150. 12 C.F.R. § 34.34 (b) (2011).
151. Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C06-6510 TEH, 2008 WL 1883484, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal.
April 29, 2008).
152. Id. at *12-13.
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This area of law is one that has historically been exempt from the pre-emptive
effect of federal banking laws, evidence of which is apparent from the OCC and
OTS regulations, which, carve out exceptions for these laws from pre-emption. To
the extent federally chartered institutions and their subsidiaries have engaged in
deceptive practices in terms of the tactics they have used in pursuing foreclosures,
federal preemption should not be a barrier to state enforcement of UDAP laws
against such tactics.153
Moreover, even if a court were to find that certain regulatory functions of state
attorneys general might be curtailed by federal preemption with certain entities, the
ability of those offices to bring enforcement actions under those same laws would
appear to have been preserved by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuomo v.
Clearinghouse Ass’n, discussed above.154 The meaning of the Clearinghouse case
is still to be determined. In any event, it preserves the ability of state attorneys
general to bring enforcement actions against even federally chartered institutions.
A question remains, though: do enforcement actions under state UDAP laws fall
within the powers of an attorney general’s office authorized in Clearinghouse? If
so, even if the laws themselves may be pre-empted to the extent a regulatory body
seeks to use them to carry out mere regulatory oversight of a federally chartered
institution, the Clearinghouse decision seems to suggest that pre-emption would
not limit the ability of state attorneys general to bring state enforcement actions
under those same laws.
Apart from this potential dispute over the meaning of the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Clearinghouse case, with respect to federal pre-emption of any
enforcement actions directed towards federally chartered institutions and their
subsidiaries under state UDAP laws, the following facts remain. First, financial
institutions that are not regulated by the OCC or the OTS would not be able to raise
pre-emption as a defense. Second, even federally chartered banks and thrifts would
have to show that the application of the UDAP laws as they relate to foreclosure
processes and the collection of debts are being applied in a discriminatory fashion
in terms of federal banks and thrifts. Finally, in order to invoke pre-emption as a
defense, such institutions would have to show that such laws are not within the
scope of laws traditionally enforced by the states, such as state laws related to real
property, contracts, and torts. As a result, it is unlikely that federal pre-emption of
state UDAP laws is a significant barrier to enforcement actions brought to rein in
the practices evident in the Robo-Sign Scandal.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Robo-Sign Scandal has exposed deep flaws in the practices of many
mortgage lenders and mortgage servicers. These flaws expose those entities to
liability under many states’ consumer protection laws, notably the collection of
state statutes considered UDAP laws. These UDAP laws are broad in their reach
and offer litigants pursuing claims under them a range of remedies, from restitution
to injunctions. The threat of litigation from lawsuits under these statutes is real,
153. Of course, those institutions that do not qualify as federally chartered institutions would not be
able to claim federal preemption of state UDAP laws.
154. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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and the pressure to settle such actions in the wake of admissions of abusive
foreclosure practices will be strong. State attorneys general pursuing such claims,
and wielding such threats can work with lenders and servicers to come to sensible
solutions that not only root out abusive practices, but help reform the mortgage
market. There is no better place to start in this road to reform than working with
lenders to write down and forgive mortgage principal. This will help align
borrower debt with the assets that secure that debt. Short of such settlements,
financial institutions face the prospect of stiff penalties, multiple damage claims
and injunctions preventing them from bringing tainted foreclosure actions.
Aligning borrower debt to home values will help re-align and balance incentives,
reducing the risk of foreclosure for hundreds of thousands of borrowers. Such a realignment will also help stabilize the mortgage market by reducing the number of
mortgages in the foreclosure pipeline and slowing the flow of properties entering
the mortgage market at reduced, post-foreclosure prices. Once supply slows,
demand will rise, as will prices.
The state attorneys general have an opportunity, through strategic use of their
UDAP enforcement powers, to pursue claims that foreclosure practices ran
roughshod over consumer protection laws and the laws that govern those
foreclosures. This opportunity can give rise to critical advances in stabilizing home
prices and the mortgage market, and reduce volatility in those prices and markets.
State law enforcement officials should not hesitate to pursue these claims and
utilize all tools at their disposal to move from scandal to settlement, and uncertainty
to resolution.

